| Abstract: | ABSTRACT Public sector ethics is a topic of ongoing concern in developed democracies. The most popular theoretical approach to this issue is found in principal–agent theory literature. This approach assumes that public sector organizations are populated by principals and agents, each of whom pursue their own self-interest, with agents having a persistent informational advantage. A second approach to ethical conflicts focuses on cognitive processes. According to cognitive theory, all decision makers are vulnerable to “ethical numbing,” particularly in organizational settings that condone the substitution of personal agendas for organizational goals. We argue that Canada's sponsorship scandal has been interpreted almost exclusively from a principal–agent perspective, with subsequent reforms firmly based on introducing new rules to oblige agents to advance the interests of principals. While more faithful adherence to established rules by agents would have avoided a scandal, such adherence is unlikely to be achieved through incentives, monitoring, and penalties as suggested by principal–agent theory. The policy message contained in and implied by the cognitive framework suggests that the focus must be on creating an organizational learning environment that discourages responsible public officials from reframing decision situations in a manner that allows them to become morally disengaged. |
