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经营者自定薪酬的控制机制探索
引用本文:朱羿锟. 经营者自定薪酬的控制机制探索[J]. 河北法学, 2006, 24(1): 26-30
作者姓名:朱羿锟
作者单位:暨南大学,法学院,广东,广州,510632
摘    要:经营者因利益冲突而寻租,经营者自定薪酬大行其道,致使年薪制在实践中背离其设计目标.程序公正成为控制经营者自定薪酬的关键,这就要求提高经营者薪酬透明度;通过排除"灰色董事"和引入商事判断规则,超越董事会潜规则,增强利益冲突隔离机制的有效性;股东大会的事前控制应定位于薪酬政策和长期激励方案,并通过引入股东提案权和代表诉讼机制,强化股东对经营者薪酬的事后监督.

关 键 词:经营者  薪酬  薪酬委员会  股东监督
文章编号:1002-3933(2006)01-0026-05
修稿时间:2005-08-24

Exploration into the Control Mechanism for Self-dealing in Executive Compensation
ZHU Yi-kun. Exploration into the Control Mechanism for Self-dealing in Executive Compensation[J]. Hebei Law Science, 2006, 24(1): 26-30
Authors:ZHU Yi-kun
Abstract:The executive's rent extraction due to confiict of interest results in widespread self-dealing in executive remuneration, and annual remuneration package's deviation from the goal of its design in practice.The procedural justice is critical to the control of self-dealing in executive remuneration.While enhancing executive remuneration transparency is the basis,it is of pressing necessity to improve the effectiveness of Chinese Wall for segregating such conflict of interest by excluding"gray directors",and overcoming boardroom norm thfough the adoption of business judgment rule.The AGM's prior monitoring shall aim at the executive remuneration policy and long-term incentive scheme,and the shareholder's post monitoring through shareholder proposal and derivative action shall be put into place.
Keywords:executive  remuneration  remuneration committee  shareholder monitoring
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