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Strategic Voting in Open Primaries
Authors:Chen  Kong-Pin  Yang   Sheng-Zhang
Affiliation:1. Institute for Social Sciences and Philosophy, and Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, 11529, Taiwan
2. Chung-Hsing Securities, Taipei, Taiwan
Abstract:The purpose of an open primary is to incorporate more moderatevotes into the primary elections. This intention may backfirewhen nonparty members strategically participate in theprimary, and the result of an open primary might become even moreextreme than when nonparty members are not allowed to participate.Realizing this, the party members might also votestrategically to counter-react. If this occurs, then it mightactually coordinate the votes of the party's supporters. Theeffect of strategic voting behavior on the result of aprimary depends on the size of the party, turnout rate ofnonparty members, the positions of the candidates and theproportion of voters who vote strategically. Strategic votingbehavior can sometimes improve social welfare.
Keywords:
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