“现实的人”与“惟一者”：马克思与施蒂纳的主体论之别

马克思与施蒂纳的争论关涉到如何理解形而上学、本质主义在马克思哲学中的地位问题。马克思受施蒂纳影响而提出的“现实的人”，与施蒂纳主张的“惟一者”虽然都具有主体自持性的特点，但在是否追求本质（精神）世界，是否承担对虚无的充实，是否追求永恒、普遍、整体，“现实”或“感性”中是否还拥有超出离散性原子事实的整体性维度及与此相关的超验性维度，对人、现实、历史的理解还是否需要保持辩证法的框架等方面，存在根本性的差异：马克思的回答是肯定的，施蒂纳是否定的。马克思的“现实的人”仍然具有以“现实”、“感性”为根基的“本质性”、“普遍性”、“神圣性”和某种意义上的“抽象性”。所谓马克思反现代性、反本质主义和反传统形而上学，也只能在这样有限的限度内理解，否则就等于把马克思施蒂纳化了。

Person in Reality and the Sole One:Distinction between Max and Stirner in Subjectivity

Max and Stirner argued about the position of metaphysics and essentialism in the philosophy of Maxism. Influenced by Stirner, Max proposed "Person in Reality" with identification of "the Sole One" advocated by Stirner in terms of subjectivity, but there still exist radical distinctions in the following aspects: pursuit of essential world, pursuit of eternity, universality, integrity, keeping a dialectic framework in interpreting people, reality and history, etc.. Max' answers to the above are positive, while Stirner negative. Max's "Person in Reality" is still equipped with "essentialism", "universality", "holiness" and somewhat "abstractness" based on "reality" and "sensibility". The so-called Max's anti-modernity, anti-essentialism and anti-traditional metaphysics should be interpreted within such a restriction, or Max would be Stirnerized.