| Abstract: | Abstract Although the 1994 Agreed Framework offers a solution to the North Korean nuclear crisis, many problems may prevent its successful implementation. Should the Agreed Framework break down, the United States and South Korea have indicated that they will ask Japan to join them in a trilateral economic sanctions regime. Japanese participation would include the severance of trade and financial flows, including money sent to North Korea from Japan's ethnic Korean community. In this paper I examine this financial flow, and, finding it a valuable linkage to the North Korean economy, conclude that Japanese participation is vital for a successful sanctions regime against North Korea. Given this, I examine whether or not Tokyo's cooperation will be forthcoming. Japan would be inclined to participate given that it has a strong interest in eliminating a regional nuclear threat. Furthermore, Japan would also feel pressure from its allies to display diplomatic leadership in the Asia‐Pacific region, as befits a country of its economic importance. Despite these international reasons for Japanese participation, domestic factors will be likely to prevent Tokyo from joining a sanctions regime: constitutional questions, the possibility of terrorist reprisals, interest in Pyongyang's regime maintenance, concerns for the rights of Japan's ethnic Korean community, and political ties between North Korean and Japanese politicians. I find that these domestic factors will outweigh international pressures for Japanese participation, and thus conclude that in the event of a breakdown in the Agreed Framework, alternatives to a trilateral sanctions strategy against North Korea must be considered. |
