A Conception of Moral Rights and Its Application to Property and Welfare Rights*

Abstract
This article deals with the conceptual features and the rational justification of moral rights. For this purpose, the author starts with a common classification of rights, i.e., the distinction between rights in rem and rights in personam . He argues that rights of the first kind can be justified by a two-fold application of the principle of universalizability, while the latter are based on moral rules concerning special social relations, rules which themselves are founded on the principle of universalizability. This distinction, however, does not suffice to cover a further category of rights that play a very important role in social life, namely the rights of community membership, i.e., the particular rights that exist between the members of a social community. These rights cannot be derived from universalizability alone, but, instead, are based on the idea of social justice. This paper provides a short account of the main principles of social justice, and tries to apply them to property and welfare rights.