| Abstract: | General and developmental theories take very different approaches to the study of crime. General theories, like Gottfredson and Hirschi's recent theory of self-control, assume that crime can be explained with reference to a single or very limited set of explanatory factors. In addition, some general theories, like Gottfredson and Hirschi's, adopt a very static approach to causality. They presume that prior offending has no causal effect on current offending once time-stable criminal propensity is controlled, and they assume that the relationship between changes in life events and changes in offending are spurious. Recent developmental theories, like those proposed by Moffitt and Patterson, stand in stark contrast to Gottfredson and Hirschi's theory. These developmental theories are far more complex because they relax the assumption of general causality and adopt a more dynamic position about the relationship between changes in life circumstances and changes in crime. In this article we examine whether the added complexity of a developmental theory of crime is preferable to the more parsimonious general/static theory of Gottfredson and Hirschi. We find that the evidence is not faithful to either a pure static/general model or a pure developmental model of crime. Our findings appeal to a theoretical middle ground that assumes that pathways to crime are more similar than different and that allows for a causal effect of past offending and life experiences on future criminality. When viewed in the context of previous studies that have assessed offending over the life course, our results suggest that further theoretical development can profit from studying issues of measurement and sample composition. |
