A principal-agent model of corruption |
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Authors: | Nico Groenendijk |
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Affiliation: | (1) Faculty of Public Administration and Public Policy, University of Twente, The Netherlands |
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Abstract: | One of the new avenues in the study of political corruption is that of neo-institutional economics, of which the principal-agent theory is a part. In this article a principal-agent model of corruption is presented, in which there are two principals (one of which is corrupting), and one agent (who is corrupted). The behaviour of these principals and agent is analysed in terms of the costs and benefits associated with different actions. The model is applied to political corruption in representative democracies, showing that, contrary to common belief, the use of principal-agent models is not limited to bureaucratic corruption. This revised version was published online in July 2006 with corrections to the Cover Date. |
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