DETERRENCE,CRIMINAL OPPORTUNITIES,AND POLICE

In this article, we join three distinct literatures on crime control—the deterrence literature, the policing literature as it relates to crime control, and the environmental and opportunity perspectives literature. Based on empirical findings and theory from these literatures, we pose a mathematical model of the distribution of criminal opportunities and offender decision making on which of those opportunities to victimize. Criminal opportunities are characterized in terms of the risk of apprehension that attends their victimization. In developing this model, our primary focus is on how police might affect the distribution of criminal opportunities that are attractive to would‐be offenders. The theoretical model we pose, however, is generalizable to explain how changes in other relevant target characteristics, such as potential gain, could affect target attractiveness. We demonstrate that the model has important implications for the efficiency and effectiveness of police deployment strategies such as hot spots policing, random patrol, and problem‐oriented policing. The theoretical structure also makes clear why the clearance rate is a fundamentally flawed metric of police performance. Future research directions suggested by the theoretical model are discussed.