THE POWER OF THE PURSE AND BUDGETARY ACCOUNTABILITY: EXPERIENCES FROM SUBNATIONAL GOVERNMENTS IN CHINA

Accountability is the cornerstone of fiscal administration. This research studies the relationship between accountability and the sharing of budgetary power. We found that the accountability in China is supported by the superior of bureaucratic power, instead of the comprehensiveness of various accountability components. The implication is that the accountability is facilitated in terms of emphasising to whom government officials are accountable within the chain of command, reducing goal conflicts and improving strategic goal attainment. However, it is hindered at the same time in terms of lacking evaluations perceived to be impartial, limited room for democratic accountability, over‐implementation of policies at all costs, and weak comprehensive awareness of ‘accountable for what’ (as long as it is a policy direction from the top). The structure of the power of the purse both enables and limits the tone and terrain of budget accountability in particular and government accountability in general. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.