| Abstract: | For over two decades, the theory of groupthink proposed by Irving Janis has remained the most prominent analysis of group dynamics in policy-making. Suffering from its own popularity, groupthink has become a catch-all phrase without a clear meaning. Moreover, theories of group decision-making—even when applied to public policy-making—have typically ignored political variables, focusing almost exclusively on psychological arguments. This article offers three more narrowly construed propositions about policy-making groups: (1) that extremes in the distribution of power within a decision group reduces the integrative complexity of that group's deliberations and, thus, a leader's ability to learn; (2) that extremes in group size produce similar effects; and (3) that the integrative complexity of deliberations is improved when power concentration is appropriate to group size. An examination of the Reagan Administration's decision-making in two phases of the Iran-Contra affair lends support to these hypotheses and reveals the importance of political structure in decision group dynamics. |
