Duality in Property: Commons and Anticommons |
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| Authors: | Francesco Parisi Norbert Schulz Ben Depoorter |
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| Affiliation: | aLaw and Economics Program, George Mason University School of Law, 3401 North Fairfax Drive Arlington, VA 22201, USA;bEconomics Department, University of Würzburg, Germany;cCenter for Advanced Studies in Law and Economics, Faculty of Law, Ghent University (Belgium) & Olin Fellow, Yale Law School, 2002–2003, USA |
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| Abstract: | Commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of symmetric structural departures from a unified conception of property. In this paper, we provide a dual model of property, where commons and anticommons problems are the consequence of a lack of conformity between use and exclusion rights. While commons and anticommons problems are symmetric in this sense, they are associated with asymmetric transaction costs. The paper formulates a hypothesis of legal rules for promoting unity in property and suggests a list of possible areas of application. |
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| Keywords: | Anticommons Commons Duality Property |
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