情势变更制度下的再交涉义务司法适用之反思--一个法经济学的视角

为发挥情势变更制度下的再交涉义务解决纠纷之自律性、协作性的价值理念,学理上普遍将其作为司法适用的前置程序规范并与后续司法介入效果形成体系化互动。但司法实践的运用未对学理期待予以积极回应,需要对再交涉义务的学理定位重新作出解答。从法经济学的视角来看,再交涉义务能作为实现优化当事人地位、创造新的价值以及降低成本等诸多经济功效的制度性担保工具,但受制于再交涉行为特有的博弈属性以及再交涉结构固有的不均衡因子,再交涉义务无法抑制机会主义行动风险的产生以及矫正再交涉地位的落差。原理上通过联动后续司法介入效果可治愈其适用上的弊端,但考虑到法官信息偏差之现实困境,其无法对再交涉的过程与内容作出有效的法律评价。《民法典》视域下唯有对再交涉义务祛司法适用之限缩解释,将其纯化为倡导性规范,切断其与后续司法介入效果的适用关联,限制法官介入再交涉过程之法律评价,始能最大程度上保障法官有效完成当事人利益之公平分配的司法任务。

Reflection on the Judicial Application of the Duty to Renegotiate under the System of Change of Circumstances--From the Perspective of Law and Economics Theory

In order to give play to the value and concept of autonomy and cooperative nature of the duty to renegotiate under the system of change of circumstances,theoretically,in theory,it is generally regarded as the norm on procedure prior to the judicial application,thus forming the systematic interaction with the follow-up judicial intervention.However,there is no positive response to the theoretical expectation in judicial practice and it is necessary to give a new answer to the theoretical position of the duty to renegotiate.From perspective of law and economics theory,the duty to renegotiate can serve as an institutional guarantee tool such as optimization of parties’status,creation of new values and reduction of cost,but due to its particular nature of gaming and the inherently uneven factor of renegotiation structure,it cannot refrain the occurrence of the risk in action of opportunism or correct the fall of the status of renegotiation.In theory,by means of,the defects in the application of the duty to renegotiate can be cured by the follow-up judicial intervention.However,in view of the realistic predicament of the information biasfaced by the judge,he/she cannot make effective legal evaluation of the process and content of renegotiation.From the perspective of the Civil Code,only the duty to renegotiate is explained in a limited way by excluding its judicial application,regarding it purely as a persuasive rule,cutting its connection with the follow-up judicial intervention,and limiting the judge from the legal evaluation on the renegotiation process,can it be ensured that the judge effectively performs his/herjudicial task of fairly distributing parties’benefits to the most extent.