Proportional representation under three voting procedures: An Israeli study

This paper attempts to evaluate, by means of a public opinion survey, the likely effects on the Israeli political system of replacing the extant electoral procedure of proportional SV (where every voter can vote just for one party) with either proportional AV (where voters can vote in favor of as many parties as they like), or proportional CAD (where voters can vote in favor, as well as against, as many parties as they wish). It also shows how the results of proportional AV and CAD enables one to measure the extent of affinity or rivalry existing between individual parties or party bloes. The main results are: (1) These three alternative proportional representation schemes would have considerably different effects in terms of the number and type of parties gaining representation, as well as in terms of governmental coalitions. (2) The extent of affinity (or rivalry) existing between blocs of parties is usually not symmetrical—one bloc can approve (or disapprove) of another bloc significantly more than vice versa. (3) Voters tend to vote sincerely (rather than strategically) under the proportional SV procedure. Theoretical issues and practical implications of these procedures are discussed.