The market for social norms

This article presents a semirigorous model in which a new normarises out of the workings of a market for norms. Change istriggered by a shift in either cost-benefit conditions or groupcomposition. Because individuals are heterogeneous in importantrespects, they respond differently to these triggering events.The first persons to supply new norms generally are individualswho have either superior technical knowledge of cost-benefitconditions, superior social knowledge of group dynamics, orspecial endowments that provide them with unusually high tangiblebenefits from norm reform. Members of the social audience observethe competing efforts of these norm suppliers and reward themost meritorious ones by conferring on them either esteem or,according to an alternative conception, new exchange opportunities.Under optimal conditions, members of the audience - key participantsin the demand side of the market for norms - do not free-ridebecause they incur no net costs when conferring their rewards.