A Contractualist Defense of Democratic Authority |
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Authors: | DAVID LEFKOWITZ |
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Institution: | University of North Carolina, Greensboro Philosophy Department 216 Foust Building P.O. Box 26170 Greensboro, NC 27402, USA E-mail: |
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Abstract: | Abstract. This paper provides a defense of the following thesis: When there is reasonable disagreement over the design of morally necessary collective action schemes, it would not be reasonable to reject the authority of a democratic decision procedure to settle these disputes. My first argument is a straightforward application of contractualist reasoning, and mirrors T. M. Scanlon's defense of a principle of fairness for the distribution of benefits produced by a cooperative scheme. My second argument develops and defends the intuition that treating others morally requires respecting their exercise of moral judgment, or a sense of justice. I conclude by addressing the problem of disagreement over the design of the democratic decision procedure itself, and rebutting Jeremy Waldron's claim that democratic authority is incompatible with judicial review. |
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