Constitutional judicial review and political insurance |
| |
Authors: | George Tridimas |
| |
Institution: | (1) School of Economics, University of Ulster, Shore Road, Newtownabbey, Co. Antrim, BT37 0QB, UK |
| |
Abstract: | Considering constitutional judicial review of policy, the power of courts to annul legislation, as a political insurance mechanism
to protect against losses from adverse election outcomes, the paper analyzes three questions: First, under what circumstances
a political ruler, who wins an election and the right to propose measures of policy, subjects those measures to the checking
powers of an independent judiciary. Second, the net expected gains of a political ruler from granting binary choice to the
reviewing judiciary rather than open choice. Third, the equilibrium degree of policy review power granted to the judiciary.
Differences in the policy preferences of competing politicians, the judiciary and the status quo, the probability of winning
an election and the probability that the judiciary confirms legislation passed by the incumbent emerge as the main determinants
of judicial review and its political independence. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|