Asymmetric Two-Stage Group Rent-Seeking: Comparison of Two Contest Structures |
| |
| Authors: | Stein William E Rapoport Amnon |
| |
| Institution: | 1. Department of Information & Operations Management, Texas A&M University, College Station, TX, 77843-4217, U.S.A.
2. Department of Management and Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, 85721, U.S.A.
|
| |
| Abstract: | Two variations of a two-stage rent-seeking contest areconsidered. In the first stage of the Between-Groupmodel, groups compete through the expenditure of resources bytheir members. Based on group expenditures, one winning groupis probabilistically determined. On the second stage, membersof the winning group compete with one another for an exogenousprize. In the Semi-Finals model a player is chosen fromeach group and then these players compete for the prize.Groups differ in size or in their valuation of the prize.Subgame-perfect equilibrium solutions are constructed forthese two contest structures. |
| |
| Keywords: | |
| 本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录！ |
|
