Judicial Selection: Politics,Biases, and Constituency Demands |
| |
Authors: | Stratmann Thomas Garner Jared |
| |
Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, George Mason University, Fairfax, VA, 22030, U.S.A. 2. School of Law, University of Virginia, Charlottesville, VA, 22904, U.S.A.
|
| |
Abstract: | The determinants of recent U.S. districtcourt judges and appellate court judgesselection have been subject of much debate,but little systematic evidence has beenpresented to substantiate claims regardingdiscrimination against particular groups ofjudicial nominees, nor regarding the lengthof the appointment process. We study boththe length of the nominations process, andthe likelihood of confirmation andemphasize the role of Senatorial seniorityand agenda control in the confirmationsprocess. We find that Senators with agendacontrol have a positive effect on the speedand likelihood of confirmation and thatnominees from states with comparativelysenior Senators receive expedited treatmentrelative to other nominees. Althoughpolitics matter in the confirmationprocess, Senators are responsive to aperceived ``shortage'' of judges, since theyfill seats faster when a relatively largenumber of court seats are vacant. Nomineeswith higher personal qualifications arealso more likely to experience success inconfirmations. We found no evidence ofgender or race discrimination on the partof the Senate. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|