| Abstract: | Abstract: Many interactions between adjacent elements of public administration are “resolved” by a weak form of bi-lateral and non-hierarchical coordination. There are quite intractable obstacles to achieving a good fit between bi-lateral resolution and higher order aims of government. Formal limits to the results that can be achieved by coordination may be derived from the requirements for optimality in the “Decomposition Model” of decentralised administration. Limits to human capabilities are widely recognised in contemporary computer software that is designed to be “user friendly”, yet in the design of systems of statute and administration the limits of human rationality are commonly ignored. Proper statutory definition of functional boundaries can harness innate strengths in the “bounded rationality” of which mere mortals and their institutions are capable, and partially guard against the unwanted effects of its weaknesses. Three main classes of interactions may be defined, and can be dealt with respectively by (a) an external and superior source of statutory power, (b) the use of temporary concurrence powers, and (c) statutory plans. The trick is to be clear about which applies in the circumstances. |
