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美国“一股一权”制度的兴衰及其启示
引用本文:张舫. 美国“一股一权”制度的兴衰及其启示[J]. 现代法学, 2012, 0(2): 152-163
作者姓名:张舫
作者单位:重庆大学法学院,重庆,400043
摘    要:股东控制是美国公司法的基础,而"一股一权"则是该基础的核心。纽约证券交易所在20世纪初迫于政治压力,在上市公司标准中确立了一股一权原则。但在1980年代,纽约证券交易所因美国证券交易所和纳斯达克交易所的竞争压力,放弃了这一上市标准,引起了美国学者对该原则的广泛争议。一股一权原则的合理性尽管经过了学者的多次论证,但大部分国家公司法并没有将这一原则贯彻到底。实证研究表明,股权结构与公司业绩并不存在确定的关系。允许公司按实际情况设计股权结构,可能更有利于公司长远发展,但其前提是健全公司治理制度和投资者保护制度。

关 键 词:一股一权  分类股份  股权结构

Rise & Fall of "One Share,One Vote": Controversy about Dual Class Stock in the USA
ZHANG Fang. Rise & Fall of "One Share,One Vote": Controversy about Dual Class Stock in the USA[J]. Modern Law Science, 2012, 0(2): 152-163
Authors:ZHANG Fang
Affiliation:ZHANG Fang (Chongqing University,Chongqing 400043)
Abstract:In the USA,shareholder control is the foundation of corporate law whereas one share one vote is the core of the foundation.Under political pressure,the NYEX accepted the principle of "one share,one vote" as test of listing corporations at the beginning of the 20th century.Confronted with sharp competition of the AMEX and the NASDQ in the 1980s,the NYEX had to stop employing the test,which arose much controversy among scholars.As a test,one share one vote has been justified academically for many times,but it is not carried through by most countries’ corporate laws.Positive researches show that now determinable relationship existing between share structure and corporate achievements.Permitting corporations to set up their own share structures may conduce to their development in the long run which is,however,premised on improvement of corporate governance and protection of investors.
Keywords:one share,one vote  dual class stock  share structure
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