Direct Discrimination, Indirect Discrimination and Autonomy

Western liberal democracies tend to impose duties on publicand private bodies that are often formulated as an obligationnot to discriminate. For instance, the European Union prohibitsdirect and indirect discrimination on certain grounds in certaincontexts. Under this model, indirect discrimination involvesa measure that, although it does not directly (i.e. explicitly)discriminate on the basis of a proscribed ground, produces adisparate impact that correlates with such a proscribed ground.Indirect discrimination is generally viewed, both conceptuallyand politically, as subordinate to direct discrimination. ProfessorJohn Gardner has argued that anti-discrimination law is justifiedon the basis of duties to respect other people's autonomy. Onthe base of this analysis, he argues that indirect discriminationis a secondary concept to the paradigm wrong of direct discrimination.I contend in this article that, if one adopts Gardner's autonomy-basedanalysis of anti-discrimination law, indirect discriminationis not a secondary concept to direct discrimination. Further,I argue that autonomy does not provide a convincing justificationfor the prohibition of either direct or indirect discrimination.I tentatively suggest, however, that the widespread impact ofcertain types of discrimination (alluded to by Gardner) maysupport an equality-based justification for the prohibitionof both direct and indirect discrimination.