Litigation Versus Legislation: Forum Shopping by Rent Seekers |
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Authors: | Rubin Paul H. Curran Christopher Curran John F. |
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Affiliation: | 1. Department of Economics, Emory University, Atlanta, GA, 30322-2240, U.S.A 2. Chicago Mercantile Exchange, Chicago, IL, 40606-7413, U.S.A
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Abstract: | To change the law, an interest group must choose between lobbyingthe legislature and litigating for new precedent. Lobbyingbecomes more likely as the relative benefits from rule changebecome greater, as the costs of lobbying become smaller and asthe voting strength of the interest groups becomes larger.Litigating becomes more likely as trial costs fall, as therelative benefits from rule change become greater, as theinclination of courts to change existing precedents increases,and as the interest group is involved in more trials. Examplesof using a litigating strategy include the NAACP is its battlefor racial integration and attorneys seeking change in tort law.Business, in resisting changes to tort law, has used the judicialprocess. The nature of equilibrium, if any, is not clear. |
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