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The underworld of ivory
Authors:R T Naylor
Institution:1. Department of Economics, McGill University, Montreal, Canada
Abstract:This paper examines the emergence and operation of the illegal market for ivory, paying particular attention to the institutional structure and criminogenic characteristics of the industry. It notes that many of the problems associated with modern regulation have deep historical roots. While much anti-animal trade rhetoric emphasizes the alleged participation of “organized crime” in the clandestine traffic, the reality is that, not just with ivory, but with all wildlife trade, the illegal market is run (and always has been run) by the same actors who operate the legal one, and with the same infrastructure. On the other hand, while much free-market rhetoric insists that regulations, along with taxes and prohibitions, simply lead to underground activity which frustrates the objectives of the policy, in reality the causes of the growth of the illegal market are much more complex. Certainly some illegal trade in ivory dates back to the very start of conservation regulations, but it was not sufficient to pose a threat to the survival of the affected species. Rapid growth of the illegal market really dates from the 1970s. It emerged in response, not to regulatory changes, but to inflated demand due to exogenous financial changes on one side and the interaction between increased human pressure on habitat and a shifting international geo-strategic context on the other. The ivory trade was associated with civil strife long before “blood diamonds” or “conflict timber” came into vogue. Pressure on the herds, which had reached apparently crisis proportions by the late 1980s, led to a shift from a regulatory to a prohibitory regime. Although that shift was presented as essential to save the species, the experience with supply-side controls in general calls such optimism into question. Legal initiatives originally evolved to affect market behavior in advanced industrial countries may be of dubious merit when applied to the radically different problem of policing “crimes against nature,” particularly in places where competition for resources is acute, administrative structures are weak, and governments may lack in legitimacy in the eyes of significant portions of their populations.
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