司法审查中的滥用职权标准——以最高人民法院公报案例为观察对象

考察最高人民法院公报上有关行政机关滥用职权的司法案例,可以发现其存在两种裁判逻辑。分离型裁判逻辑立基于形式违法性审查,根据"职权"或"滥用"单一要素进行判断,使得任何违法行使职权的行政行为都可能构成滥用职权。结合型裁判逻辑立基于实质违法性审查,认为构成滥用职权必须具备"职权"与"滥用"双重要素,滥用职权的实质是偏离法律目的行使裁量权。分离型裁判中的滥用职权与日常用语更为接近,结合型裁判中的滥用职权更符合行政诉讼法的立法精神。"滥用"的主观过错难以认定,影响了滥用职权标准的司法适用性。应以功能主义立场取代规则中心主义,借助均衡性的法律原则与功能性的自我规制技术,化解"滥用"之主观动机认定难的问题。

Criterion on the Abuse of Authority in Judicial Review

A case study based on the Gazette of the Supreme People’s Court shows that there are two distinct logical means of identifying the abuse of authority by administrative organs in China,that is,the separate identification and conjunctive identification,each with its own application range,identification conditions and value orientation.According to the former,which is based on formal illegality review,any illegal duty behavior may be seen as abuse of authority,as long as one of the two elements(“authority”or“abuse”)can be proved,whereas according to the latter,which is based on substantive illegality review,in order for an act to constitute abuse of authority,both the“authority”element and the“abuse”element have to be proved,and the abuse of authority is actually an abuse of discretion.The separative identification is closer to ordinary life,while the conjunctive identification is more compatible with the spirit of the Administrative Litigation Law in China.The difficulty in identifying the subjective fault may affect the judicial application of the criterion on the abuse of authority.China should adopt the functionalist position instead of legislation-centered doctrine,and apply a balanced legal principle and functional self-regulate technique to reduce the difficulty of identification of subjective motivation of“abuse”.