Perfect justice procedures |
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Authors: | Pierre Moessinger |
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Affiliation: | (1) Université de Fribourg, Fribourg, Switzerland;(2) 46, Maraîchers, CH-1205 Geneva, Switzerland |
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Abstract: | Perfect justice procedures are such that rule out envy. At the core of such procedures lies the divide-and-choose procedure (one divides, the other chooses), which guarantees that individuals be satisfied with outcomes. The divide-and-choose principle is extended here ton individuals, to the sharing of nondividable goods, to job allocation, and to social satisfaction. The introduction of this principle into social psychology and sociology is proposed, and a comparison between equity and satisfaction is outlined. |
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Keywords: | procedural justice allocation decisions social satisfaction equity |
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