Strategic Considerations and Judicial Review: The Case of Workers' Compensation Laws in the American States

Whether state supreme court justices votesincerely or strategically depends upon:(1) justices' sincere preferences; (2)ideological differences between a justiceand other state actors, which affect the willingness of actors tosanction justices; and (3) institutionalrules and political settings, which affect the ability of otheractors to retaliate against justices forobjectionable decisions. Since institutional rules do notvary for the U.S. Supreme Court but do forthe 50 states, state supreme court cases are thebest site for testing conditions underwhich justices are likely to vote strategically. Moreover,amendment of state constitutions isrelatively easy, which permits systematic examination of theextent to which strategic behavior manifests in judicialreview cases. Using data on docketing anddecisions on workers' compensation laws for1970–1993, this research offers a broaderunderstanding of strategic behavior byjudges.