论判断《联合国海洋法公约》中军事活动的主体基准问题

2019年国际海洋法法庭和2020年仲裁庭,就乌克兰与俄罗斯的刻赤海峡争端下达的临时措施命令和初步反对意见裁决书中阐述的一些见解,使是否可以基于军舰等行为主体的军事性质,判断其进行的活动属于军事活动问题再次浮出水面。从可行性的角度来看,基于行为主体的性质来判断一个活动是否为军事活动的思路,即"主体基准"理论,存在明显的局限性。但考虑到《联合国海洋法公约》的宗旨和目的,尤其是第298条的起草目的,这一基准是合理的也是必要的。在不违背公约宗旨和目的的条件下,基于内在的逻辑联系检讨"主体基准"和"目的基准"的融合,可能会形成一个更加合理的判断基准。

Concerning of the Criterion of Subject in Defining Military Activities on UNCLOS

The Order provided by International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2019,and the Award provided by the Arbitral Tribunal in 2020 on disputes in Kerch Strait between Ukraine and Russia,raised the issue of whether the activities launched by military vessels could be defined as military activities for the specificity of the military nature of the subjects. It is obvious that considering military nature of the subjects as a criterion for judging military activities,also as theory of "criterion of subject",contains inevitable limitation on its feasibility.However,according to the object and purpose of UNCLOS,in particular the purpose demonstrated in the drafting process of article 298,such a criterion is reasonable and necessary.Therefore,rethinking the logical connection between "criterion of subject"and "criterion of object"as the courts provided in the documents,could possibly promote a further admissible criterion.