Together Forever? Explaining Exclusivity in Party–Firm Relations

Parties and firms are the key actors of representative democracy and capitalism, respectively, and the dynamic of attachment between them is a central feature of any political economy. This is the first article to analyse systematically the exclusivity of party–firm relations. We consider exclusivity at a point in time and exclusivity over time. Does a firm have a relationship with only one party at a given point in time, or is it close to more than one party? Does a firm maintain a relationship with only one party over time, or does it switch between parties? Most important, how do patterns of exclusivity impact on a firm's ability to lobby successfully? We propose a general theory, which explains patterns of party–firm relations by reference to the division of institutions and the type of party competition in a political system. A preliminary test of our theory with Polish survey data confirms our predictions, establishing a promising hypothesis for future research.