| 基于政府采购经济效益的微观经济学分析 |
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| 引用本文： | 原静雯,陈红梅. 基于政府采购经济效益的微观经济学分析[J]. 西南政法大学学报, 2012, 14(5): 127-130 |
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| 作者姓名： | 原静雯 陈红梅 |
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| 作者单位： | 1. 中国人民大学信息学院,北京,100086
2. 西南政法大学管理学院,重庆,401120 |
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| 摘 要： | 政府采购作为利用国家财政资金和政府借款购买货物、工程和服务的行为,对于我国的经济发展起着重要的作用。在采购活动中,存在着委托代理问题、合作博弈问题以及福利效益不能最大化等问题。本文从微观经济学角度对政府采购中的上述3个问题进行分析,并给出合理的解决方案。
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| 关 键 词： | 政府采购 委托代理问题 博弈论 福利经济学 |
Microeconomic Analysis on the Economic Benefit of Government Procurement |
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| YUAN Jing-wen , CHEN Hong-mei. Microeconomic Analysis on the Economic Benefit of Government Procurement[J]. Journal of Swupl, 2012, 14(5): 127-130 |
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| Authors: | YUAN Jing-wen CHEN Hong-mei |
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| Affiliation: | 1.School of Information,Renmin University of China,Beijing 100086; 2.School of Management,Southwest University of Political Science and Law,Chongqing 401120,China) |
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| Abstract: | Government procurement which refers to using national financial fund and government borrowing to purchase goods,to construct project or to get service,plays a key role in the development of China’s economy.However,there are principal-agent problems,cooperative problems and the problems of maximizing welfare and benefit in such economic activities.The present study analyzes these problems from the perspective of microeconomics,and proposes solutions at the end. |
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| Keywords: | government procurement principal-agent problems game theory welfare economics |
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