Market and institutional determinants in the regulation of conveyancers

Demand for law professionals in the conveyancing of property is decreasing because of market and institutional changes. On the market side, many transactions feature large, well-known parties and standardized transactions, which make professionals less effective or necessary for protecting the parties to private contracts. On the institutional side, public titling makes it possible to dispense with a broadening set of their former functions. Recording of deeds made professionals redundant as depositories of deeds and reduced demand for them to design title guarantees. Effective registration of rights increasingly substitutes professionals for detecting title conflicts with third parties and gathering their consent. Market changes undermine the information asymmetry rationale for regulating conveyancing, while institutional changes facilitate liberalizing not only conduct but also license regulations. These arguments are supported here by disentangling the logic of titling systems and presenting empirical evidence from the European and USA markets. The author thanks John D. Cooke, Fernando Gómez Pomar, Pamela O'Connor, Joyce D. Palomar, Ruth Paserman, Mark C. Schechter, Frank Stephen, Christine C. Wilson and participants at the Ninth EU Competition Law and Policy Workshop, the Eigth ISNIE conference and Université de Paris X for their comments and Ana Estrada for her research assistance. Usual disclaimers apply.