Three Separation Theses

Legal positivism's ``separationthesis' is usually taken in one of two ways: asan analytic claim about the nature of law –roughly, as some version of the SocialThesis; or as a substantive claim about themoral value of law – roughly, as some versionof the Value Thesis. In this paper Iargue that we should recognize a third kind ofpositivist separation thesis, one whichcomplements, but is distinct from, positivism'sanalytic and moral claims. The NeutralityThesis says that the correct analytic claimabout the nature of law does not by itself entail anysubstantive claims about the moral value oflaw. I give careful formulations of these threeseparation theses; explain the relationshipsbetween them; and sketch the role that eachplays in the positivist approach to law.