Entrenching Bills of Rights

The entrenchment of a bill of rights, and the consequent removalof the matters covered in the bill from the domain of the legislature,is commonly thought to constitute a transfer of power from thelegislature to the courts. Yet the simple answer to this thoughtis that, strictly speaking, no such transfer takes place, forin acquiring power to determine the content of a bill of rightsthe courts do not acquire the power to legislate that the billdenies to the legislature. The more complex response is thatwhat the courts acquire when a bill of rights is entrenchedis the power to set a constitutional agenda, a power that thelegislature may never have had and so has not necessarily lost,a power the political significance of which depends on the formand content of what is entrenched and the value and characterof the power it leaves in the hands of the legislature. In particular,the entrenchment of a project of governance (as typified bythe positive duties conventionally associated with economicand social rights) raises concerns about the power exercisedby courts that are not raised by the entrenchment of a projectof non-governance (as typified by the negative duties conventionallyassociated with civil and political liberties). Non-governancemay be objectionable, but not because the courts secure it.Governance, however, may be objectionable just because the courtssecure it.