Speed of Decision-Making as a Procedural Justice Principle

The uncertainty management theory (Lind and Van den Bos, Research in organizational behavior 24, 181–223, 2002; Van den Bos and Lind, Advances in experimental social psychology, pp. 1–60, 2002) proposes that perceived fairness decreases experienced uncertainty, and, thus, the importance of fairness is enhanced under higher uncertainty. For example, the six procedural justice principles (Leventhal, Social exchange: advances in theory and research pp. 27–55, 1980) can be seen to reduce uncertainty in the long run by producing higher quality decisions. However, the decision-making process itself also may cause uncertainty, especially when the process is prolonged. Thus, we bring the speed of the decision-making process into discussion as one justice principle. We suggest that people use speed-related information as heuristic information and substitute lacking procedures-related information by drawing inferences from the speed of the decision-making. We propose that the speed of decision-making has a twofold effect on perception of procedural fairness: very fast and very slow decision-making processes are perceived to produce more uncertainty than moderate time processes, and consequently, a moderate process is expected to be related with more positive fairness perceptions than very slow or very fast processes. The statement was further tested by examining the mediating role of procedural fairness perceptions in the relationship between speed and its one consequence, perceived legitimacy, with a survey sample (N = 846) in the context of Finnish forest policy. The analysis confirmed the hypotheses. The role of speed as a justice rule and its contribution to the uncertainty management theory is discussed.