One Myth of the Classical Natural Law Theory: Reflecting on the “Thin” View of Legal Positivism |
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| Authors: | Veronica Rodriguez‐Blanco Pilar Zambrano |
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| Affiliation: | 1. Surrey Centre for Law & Philosophy University of Surrey School of Law, Guildford, Surrey, United Kingdom;2. University of Navarra, Campus Universitario, Pamplona, SpainThis article is a result of the Research Project (2014–2015) “Constructivismo, razón y derecho: Una aproximación desde la tesis de la determinación” (II), 10° Concurso interno de proyectos de investigación, Universidad Austral, Argentina. |
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| Abstract: | Much controversy has emerged on the demarcation between legal positivism and non‐legal positivism with some authors calling for a ban on the ‐as they see it‐ nonsensical labelling of legal philosophical debates. We agree with these critics; simplistic labelling cannot replace the work of sophisticated and sound argumentation. In this paper we do not use the term ‘legal positivism’ as a simplistic label but identify a specific position which we consider to be the most appealing and plausible view on legal positivism. This is the view advocated by Gardner in his paper 'Legal Positivism: 5½ Myths’ (Gardner 2001 , 199), where he carefully scrutinises the most convincing and unifying postulates of legal positivism, which he calls “the thin view”. The study shows that this thin view presupposes an empirical conception of action that is untenable and implausible since it makes acts of engagement with the law unintelligible to an observer of such acts. |
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