Juvenile diversion and the constitution

The juvenile justice system has been a product of interaction between legal and socio-medical forces since its inauguration near the end of the last century. While the socio-medical forces have, for the most part, been dominant over the years, concern for minimum legal standards has been a conspicuous part of the picture since the years 1966 to 1967. The result is serious attention to due process and fundamental fairness in court processing, and low tolerance for abridgement of such rights in the interests of attaining the social goal of rehabilitation. The question arises as to how early in the procedural chain for juveniles various due process rights should enter. Some have argued that important due process rights should be components in the process leading to probation, and even police, diversion. The central argument of this article is that broad directives regarding due process in diversion are inappropriate. Indeed, analysis of actual and potential losses of freedom associated with diversion decisions leads to the general conclusion that very few diversion programs require usual procedural rights. Moreover, a survey of case law indicates that there is little reason to expect that the procedural protections enunciated by the U.S. Supreme Court so strongly in the 1960s will be extended by the courts to police (or probation) decisions on diversion in the 1980s.