| Abstract: | The Bush administration's plan for a new Department of Homeland Security is often described as the most comprehensive effort at institutional reform since the 1947 National Security Act (NSA). Unfortunately, many of the references to the NSA are misleading. This study surveys the debates that culminated in the passage of the NSA, then traces the evolution of the key agencies created by the NSA from 1947 to 1991. The author considers why so little institutional reform took place during the period between the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001, and then offers some points of reference for the evolving debate about post-9/11 reform of the national security bureaucracy. He concludes that the president and Congress risk weakening, rather than strengthening, U.S. national security if they create a Department of Homeland Security but leave in place an institutional infrastructure that was designed for a different time and a different set of problems. |
