论合同治理和关系治理的互补性与有效性

正式的合同治理与非正式的关系治理是互补性的。相关研究通常将关系治理和合同治理看作是可替代性的,因为信任能降低交易成本,也能够替代正式合同的刹手闸作用。研究表明:合同治理不仅不会阻止关系治理的发展或者成为关系性治理的替代者,相反,良好的、详尽的合同实际上会提升交易各方间长期的、合作性的信任关系;良好的合同缩小了与交易相关的风险范畴,并降低了其严重性,因而会鼓励和促进合作与信任关系的发展;良好的合同通过强化对有关交易的风险,如道德风险的惩罚,有助于长期交易关系的发展;关系治理也有助于合作者间发展出有关处理不确定性的柔性规则和程序,当不可预见的事件发生后,有助于合作伙伴间的相互调适,从而维持双方的交易关系,并因此提高交易效率。

The Complementarities and Effectiveness of Contractual Governance,Relational Governance

The contractual governance and the relational governance are complementary. The well-designed contracts can promote the development of long-term cooperative trust relationship between or among parties involved, because they can not only reduce the risk severity associated with specific contraction, but they can also reinforce the punishments connected with moral hazard and disobey behaviors. Meanwhile, the ongoing long-term relationship such as trust can facilitate the contract adjustments in specific transactional contexts, also it can reduce the unexpected risks associated with uncertainty, and then it can overcome the limitations of contractual governance.