Terrorism and Human Rights: A Perspective from the United Nations

ABSTRACT

The chapter begins with a discussion of the draft definition of terrorism in the UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, a definition which covers both terrorist blackmail and intimidation of target audiences but does not address the terrorist goal of impressing potential and actual constituencies with their “propaganda by the deed”. It distinguishes then between a military response to terrorism, based on maximum force within the framework of the laws of war, and a law enforcement response, based on minimal use of force, within the framework of the rule of law. Subsequently twelve principles of the rule of law are outlined and their relationship to human rights is clarified. Next a discussion of specific human rights and how they relate to terrorism and countering terrorism follows. The activities of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the UN Office on Drugs and Crime are discussed in the framework of the three-pronged UN Strategy against international terrorism. The chapter ends by stressed that upholding human rights and effective anti-terrorist measures are not exclusive. On the contrary: human rights and the rule of law are essential tools in the effort to combat terrorism.

By its very nature, terrorism is an assault on the fundamental principles of law, order, human rights, and peaceful settlement of disputes upon which the United Nations is established.

K. Annan, 4 October 2002

Notes

The views and opinions expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the United Nations where the author serves as senior crime prevention and criminal justice officer of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the Office on Drugs and Crime in Vienna.

UN Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism, Comprehensive Convention [draft], Article 2–A/C.6/56/L.9, annex I.B.

‘Coordinateur du Mardi Saint’, Ramzi Ben Al-Shaiba promettait ‘un Millier d'autres Operations de ce Type’, Le Monde (16 Sep. 2001) p. 2. F. Halliday observed in a similar vein: ‘11 September did not, nor was it designed to, destroy America as a power so much as to mobilize support against its Middle Eastern allies’. Fred Halliday, Two Hours that Shock the World?–?September 11, 2001: Causes & Consequences (London: Saqi Books 2002).

An example of this communication function (which is linked to intimidation) is a statement broadcasted by Al Jazeera in early October 2002 in which Aiman Al Zawahiri, the No. 2 in Al-Qaeda said, referring to the attack on German tourists in front of the Jewish synagogue in Djerba, Tunis, and to the attack on the French oil tanker Limburg off the coast of Yemen: ‘The Mujahedeen youth has sent one message to Germany and another to France. Should the dose [of the message] not have been sufficient, we are ready – of course with the help of Allah – to increase the dose’. Der Spiegel 21 Oct. 2002. For an interpretation of terrorism along these lines, see A. P. Schmid, Violence as Communication (Beverly Hills: Sage 1982).

‘Remember. September 11 Changed the World. But Not Enough’, The Economist (7 Sep. 2002) p.11. Osama bin Laden expressed the hope that ‘these events [9/11] have divided the world into two camps, the camp of the faithful and the camp of infidels’. Bin Laden Statement, 7 October 2001: ‘The Sword Fell’, in John Prados (ed), America Confronts Terrorism: Understanding the Danger and How to Think About It (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee 2002), p.13.

Osama bin Laden has been explicit about his goal: ‘We are seeking to incite the Islamic nation to rise up to liberate its land and to conduct a jihad for the sake of God’. Carl Conetta, Dislocating Alcyoneus: How to Combat al-Qaeda and the New Terrorism (New York: Columbia University Press 2002) p.2.

With regard to Al-Qaeda, Brian M. Jenkins hypothesized:‘ Al Qaeda's leadership probably anticipated that the attack would provoke a major military response, which it could then portray as an assault on Islam. This would inspire thousands of additional volunteers and could provoke the entire Islamic world to rise up against the West. Governments that opposed the people's wrath, quislings to western imperialism, would fall. The West would be destroyed’. Brian M. Jenkins, Countering al Qaeda: An Appreciation of the Situation and Suggestions for Strategy (St. Monica: RAND 2002) p.7.

For an elaboration of these two models, see Ronald D. Crelinsten, ‘Analysing Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism: A Communication Model’, Terrorism and Political Violence 14/2 (Summer 2002) pp.77–122.

Mary Robinson, ‘Human Rights Are as Important as Ever’, International Herald Tribune 21 June 2002. In another statement, Kofi Annan said: ‘while the international community must be resolute in countering terrorism, it must be scrupulous in the ways in which this effort is pursued. The fight against terrorism should not lead to the adoption of measures that are incompatible with human rights standards. Such a development would hand a victory to those who so blatantly disregard human rights in their use of terror. Greater respect for human rights, accompanied by democracy and social justice, will in the long term prove effective measures against terror. The design and enforcement of means to fight terrorism should therefore be carried out in strict adherence with international human rights obligations’. Kofi Annan, Message to the African Union's High Level Inter-Governmental Meeting on Terrorism, Algiers 11 Sep. 2002.

Sergio Vieira de Mello, Statement before the Counter Terrorism Committee of the Security Council, New York, 21 Oct. 2002.

Roger S. Clark, ‘The United Nations Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Program’, Formulation of Standards and Efforts at Their Implementation (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1994) pp.95–125.

Annex to A/57/273–S/2002/875 Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism. General Assembly/Security Council (Provisional Agenda Item 162).

SC RES 1456 (2003).