Between diffusion and territorial consolidation in rebellion: Striking at the hard core of the Intifada

The leadership of the Intifada in the territories, the United National Command (UNC), called for an organization of small units to maximize efficiency, and for the continuous proliferation of these organizational units to reduce the Intifada's vulnerability. A strategy of low‐scale violence, requiring little prior training and skill, facilitated wide scale‐recruitment.

To sustain a rebellion over a long period, there was a need to create territory‐wide organizations, which also provided services to a public which experienced great hardships. Territorial consolidation was never achieved, partly because the diaspora‐centered PLO feared potential competitors in the territories. Thus, the recruitment pool shrunk, and a vulnerable hard core emerged.

A strategy of organizational diffusion increases the need for centralized control, a function which the UNC failed to perform. Political strife within the hard core, increasing abuse of its power, and social lawlessness compounded the problem of vulnerability, and eventually transformed a popular Intifada into a manhunt.