Governance choice on a serial network |
| |
Authors: | Feng Xie David Levinson |
| |
Institution: | 1. 2350 Glenmont Circle #2350 1/2, Silver Spring, MD, 20902, USA 2. University of Minnesota, 500 Pillsbury Drive SE, Minneapolis, MN, 55455, USA
|
| |
Abstract: | This paper analyzes governance choice in a two-level federation in providing road infrastructure across jurisdictions. Two models are proposed to predict the choice of centralized or decentralized spending structure on a serial road network shared by two districts. While the first model considers simple Pigouvian behavior of governments, the second explicitly models political forces at both a local and central level. Both models led to the conclusions that the spending structure is chosen based on a satisfactory comprise between benefits and costs associated with alternative decision-making processes, and that governance choice may spontaneously shift as the infrastructure improves temporally. |
| |
Keywords: | |
本文献已被 SpringerLink 等数据库收录! |
|