Still Just Rhetoric? Judicial Discretion and Due Process |
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Authors: | Imogen Jones |
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Institution: | (1) School of Law, University of Manchester, Oxford Road, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK |
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Abstract: | Judicial discretion is crucial in determining whether, in practice, those accused of crimes experience the protection of due
process safeguards during the trial process. In this article, two examples of evidential rules and their judicial interpretation
are examined. They are assessed in the context of the common critique that discretion is utilised primarily to the effect
of denying due process protections in practice. This analysis takes place in the particular context of the punitive turn in
the politics of criminal justice. A detailed examination of the interpretation of s114(1)(d) and s101(1)(d) in conjunction
with s101(3) of the Criminal Justice Act 2003, regulating the admission of hearsay and bad character evidence, is carried
out in order to gain insight into the modern role of judicial discretion. Conclusions are drawn by proposing some theoretical
models of the relationship between statutory content, the interpretation of those provisions and the effects of these on the
experience of defendants in criminal trials. |
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Keywords: | |
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