To Wonderland Through the Looking-glass: Conceiving a Critical Legal Argument for Contractual Justice in the South African Law of Contract†

The aim of this paper is to identify the possible substructure (looking glass/es) of a critical legal argument for contractual justice (Wonderland) in the South African law of contract. South African contract law still fails, ten years after the constitutional transformation, to reflect the constitutional ideals of freedom, equality and human dignity in an acceptable manner. I argue that this disposition places a question mark over the legitimacy of contract law and marginalizes opportunities for the social change envisaged by the Constitution. The paper explores Duncan Kennedy’s Form and Substance-argument and indicates that the reluctance to accommodate these values may be attributable to the fact that the majority of role-players position themselves on the individualism/rules side of Kennedy’s continuum – a paradigm that perceives the law of contract as a body of positivistic rules to be applied neutrally and regardless of the social or socio-economic distortions its application may generate. In an attempt to move away from this traditional approach, the privileged paradigm is criticised. A typical CLS-approach is followed which employs sociology, psychological jurisprudence and game theory to criticise the law from outside the restrictive realms of law itself. Simultaneously, I attempt to illuminate the argument for a shift (step through the looking glass) to another paradigm. I conclude that our judiciary finds itself in a position similar to that of Plato’s prisoners in the cave and will not reach the point where they apply relevant (constitutional) values directly to contractual disputes. The State is thus responsible for infusing contract law with contractual justice, by implementing legislation to this effect in order to limit the hegemonic consequences of the judiciary’s obsession with freedom of contract and utopian rules, which fail in reality to further the ideal of justice. Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 4 September 2004, London, UK. This paper is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge of Appeal, Mr. Justice P.J. Olivier. The paper is based on research conducted for the thesis in partial fulfilment of the degree LLD in the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria under the title ‘A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract.’ The degree supervisor is Professor Karin van Marle in the Department of Legal History, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence. The author wishes to thank the following persons for valuable deliberations and input: Karin van Marle, Graham Bradfield and Anashri Pillay. In addition, the author wishes to acknowledge and thank the University of Cape Town for financially supporting this research. †Paper presented at the Critical Legal Conference, 4 September 2004, London, UK. This paper is dedicated to the memory of the late Judge of Appeal, Mr. Justice P.J. Olivier. The paper is based on research conducted for the thesis in partial fulfilment of the degree LLD in the Faculty of Law at the University of Pretoria under the title ‘A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South African law of contract.’ The degree supervisor is Professor Karin van Marle in the Department of Legal History, Comparative Law and Jurisprudence. The author wishes to thank the following persons for valuable deliberations and input: Karin van Marle, Graham Bradfield and Anashri Pillay. In addition, the author wishes to acknowledge and thank the University of Cape Town for financially supporting this research. apply relevant (constitutional) values directly to contractual disputes. The State is thus responsible for infusing contract law with contractual justice, by implementing legislation to this effect in order to limit the hegemonic consequences of the judiciary’s obsession with freedom of contract and utopian rules, which fail in reality to further the ideal of justice.