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PRESIDENTIAL POLICY PREFERENCES AND SUPREME COURT APPOINTMENT SUCCESS |
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| Authors: | John B. Gates Jeffrey E. Cohen |
| Affiliation: | John B. Gates is Assistant Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Davis. He is the author of the forthcoming The Supreme Court and Partisan Realignment: A Macro and Microlevel Analysis (1990) and articles in journals. He is also co-editor of the forthcoming American Courts: A Critical Assessment (1990). His research interests include American politics, judicial politics, and methodology.;Jeffrey E. Cohen is an Associate Professor of Political Science and Adjunct Associate Professor at the Institute of Government and Public Affairs a t the University of Illinois-Urbana. He received a Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Michigan in 1979. He is the author of The Politics of the American Cabinet: Representation i n the Executive Branch, 1789–1984, published by the University of Pittsburgh Press in 1988. He is currently working on two research projects, one a study of the modern presidency, and the other, a study of state policy reactions to the divestiture of AT &T. |
| Abstract: | Presidential appointments to the U.S. Supreme Court are major constitutional events. Few studies assess whether this political process benefits presidents with appointment opportunities. This article estimates the policy success of presidents since Eisenhower in appointing favorable justices on the racial equality issues. Previous research uses the president's party affiliation as an indirect measure of presidential preferences. This research examines the president's policy stance more directly by using presidential public statements on racial equality issues. An issue specific measure of presidential preferences shows that presidents have been more successful in appointing like-minded justices than reliance on presidential party would suggest. Regression estimates of the justices aggregate voting record on racial equality cases are robust even in light of other controls. The implications for democratic theory and future research are discussed. |
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