A convergence approach to the analysis of political corruption: A cross-national study

A convergence approach to the analysis of country-level political corruptionis proposed based on Cohen and Felson's routine activities theory of crimeand Ades and Di Tells's tripartite analysis of corruption. It argues thatalthough structural incentives, risky policies, and the lack of effectiveinstitutional guardians independently contribute to the causation ofcorruption, their convergence in time and space creates opportunities forwidespread and systematic corruption. Structural incentives are stableeconomic and cultural conditions and include economic hardships,particularism, and history of political unaccountability. Risky policiesencompass monopolistic and interventionist practices by the government inthe production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services.Institutional guardians refer to the judiciary, the press, opposition partiesand the civil society that monitor officials' behavior. Data from 99countries and territories are used to evaluate hypotheses derived from thetheory. Findings lend strong support to the proposed formal propositions.It is also suggested that useful schemes for corruption diagnosis and reformcan be developed from the theory.