The Puzzling Lack of a Social Dilemma

Among theories dealing with welfare state policy development, theories of social dilemmas and of key actor-group influence over government policy formation are increasingly holding sway. These theories emphasise that few would risk being unilateral contributors to the systems without any compensating elements. Thus, selective, means-testing systems or stingy universal systems in which some citizens 'contribute' while others 'receive' may risk being regarded as unfair in the eyes of the contributors in spite of the redistributive intentions. The degree of welfare state programme 'fairness' and reciprocity would, then, explain the degree of support for the welfare state. However, by using data from the United Kingdom and Sweden, this article will, first, claim that the social dilemma research turns a blind eye to the fact that public opinion in general as well as key groups appears to be able to yield its support even when welfare states contain distinctly selective elements and low-compensation universal programmes. Second, the article will elaborate on the confusion surrounding welfare state taxonomies as one plausible reason for why social dilemma theories may risk missing the target. Finally, the article will elaborate on the future of the welfare state as we know it. The main points are that given the fact that the welfare states in the two countries really already are conglomerates of different types of welfare programmes and, given a weak relationship between key groups and policy formation, the most likely future for the welfare state is that policies will continue to follow mixed paths.