Anti-Discrimination Rights Without Equality |
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Authors: | Elisa Holmes |
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Affiliation: | Faculty of Law, University of Oxford (Magdalen College) |
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Abstract: | Anti-discrimination rights are nearly always thought to be justified or explained by equality, although the precise nature of this relationship is rarely considered. In this article I consider the two most plausible relationships, both of which are commonly at least implicitly asserted: that anti-discrimination rights are deontic equal treatment norms, and that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at achieving telic equality. I try to show that, as a conceptual matter, anti-discrimination rights are not equal treatment norms: they do not require that all people (perhaps in a certain category) are treated the same. They allow for different treatment, but they prohibit different treatment only on some grounds. Although the suggestion that anti-discrimination rights are instrumentally aimed at telic equality (in some dimension) is conceptually plausible (like all instrumental relationships), it is most unlikely that anti-discrimination rights can be justified on this ground. |
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Keywords: | discrimination equality principles human rights |
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