Majority shareholder protection by variable qualified majority rules |
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| Authors: | André Casajus Helfried Labrenz Tobias Hiller |
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| Affiliation: | 1.Chair of Economics and Information Systems,HHL Leipzig Graduate School of Management,Leipzig,Germany;2.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult?t, Professur für Mikro?konomik,Universit?t Leipzig,Leipzig,Germany;3.Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Fakult?t, Professur für Externe Unternehmensrechnung und Wirtschaftsprüfung,Universit?t Leipzig,Leipzig,Germany |
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| Abstract: | In this paper, we analyze judicial review according to the German Stock Corporation Act (Aktiengesetz, §§ 243 et seqq.) and its blocking effect with the help of concepts of cooperative game theory. In particular, we suggest variable qualified majority rules as ingredients of arrangements which balance the interests of a majority shareholder and of the minority shareholders. |
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| Keywords: | Shapley-Shubik index Shapley value Reorganization Ban of registration Application for judical review |
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