Discretion and corruption: The Chilean judiciary |
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Authors: | Gisela von Mühlenbrock |
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Affiliation: | (1) Orville Schell Center for International Human Rights Law, Orville, USA;(2) Yale Law School, Yale, USA |
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Abstract: | Corruption in the judiciary and its effects on the budget of that branch of government, the efficiency of justice (prompt or belated) and its quality (biased or impartial) are analyzed. The discretionary powers of the Supreme Court and those granted to judges to manage their courts, calendar and case load, and the hierarchical administrative structures of judiciaries, which function as a queueing system, may be used as a tool to maximize graft. These phenomena reveal links between institutional forms and incentives. Using the case of Chile and the exceptional emergence of corruption within the judiciary during the military dictatorship, the role of democracy as a punishing and preventive mechanism is highlighted.This article was written while the author was a Senior Fellow at the Orville Schell, Center for International Human Rights Law at Yale Law School, and under the auspices of the North-South Center of the University of Miami. |
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