| Abstract: | Theories of federal grants to states and localities suggestthat these grants have a stimulative effect on spending, causingrecipient governments to expand and contract programs alongwith changes in the grants. However, policymakers may responddifferently to grant decreases than to grant increases becausethey face political and bureaucratic pressures to expand programs.These asymmetric reactions may depend on specific politicalstructures. Pooled time-series regressions of data from theAid to Families with Dependent Children program across 46 statesfrom 1965 to 1994 demonstrate state government responses togrant changes. Bureaucratic pressures and proposals lead statesto expand their welfare benefits upon increases in federal grants,but not to contract them upon decreases in federal grants. Withregard to the 1996 welfare reforms, this study indicates thatthe switch to block grants will lead to little or no state reductionin welfare payments. |
